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 ASSESSING THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION’S INTENTION IN EU ECONOMIC LAW:  
CHASING GHOSTS OR DRESSING WINDOWS? 
 
Dr Albert Sanchez Graells* 
ABSTRACT 
This paper reflects about the role of subjective or intentional elements in EU economic law prohibitions, 
particularly in relation to rules addressed to the public administration. From a normative perspective, it 
stresses how, on the whole, it is desirable to suppress the need for an assessment of subjective intent 
and to proceed with an objectified enforcement of such prohibitions. In order to do so, and from a 
positive perspective, the paper looks at public procurement and State aid rules as two examples of areas 
of EU economic law subjected to interpretative and enforcement difficulties due to the introduction, 
sometimes veiled, of subjective elements in their main prohibitions. The paper establishes parallels with 
other areas of EU economic law—such as antitrust, non-discrimination law and the common 
agricultural policy—and seeks benchmarks to support the main thesis that such intentional elements 
need to be ‘objectified’, so that EU economic law can be enforced against the public administration to 
an adequate standard of legal certainty. This mirrors the development of the doctrine of abuse of EU 
law, where a similar ‘objectification’ in the assessment of subjective elements has taken place.  
The paper draws on the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union to support such 
‘objectification’ of intentional elements in EU economic law, and highlights how the Court has been 
engaging in such interpretative strategy for quite a long time. It then goes on to explore the interplay 
between such an approach and more general protections against behaviour of the public administration 
in breach of EU law: ie the right to good administration in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, and the doctrine of State liability for infringement of EU law. The paper 
concludes with the normative recommendation that the main prohibitions of EU economic law should 
be free from subjective elements focused on the intention of the public administration. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The State and its emanations need to comply with EU economic law.1 Undertakings developing 
economic activities in the internal market are also subjected to EU economic law. Despite the growing 
scope for private enforcement of EU economic law, on the whole, the entities entrusted with monitoring 
and enforcing those rules are also of a public nature, ie either public bodies or emanations of the State. 
Consequently, even if individuals are ultimately involved in each of those acts, EU economic law is 
primarily addressed to, complied with or infringed, monitored by and enforced against public and 
corporate entities, or legal persons of a collective nature.2 In this setting, given the difficulties, if not 
impossibility, in determining whose individual intention is determinative of the institutional or 
corporate behaviour under assessment, a construction of EU economic law around objective 
prohibitions contributes to legal certainty and effectiveness of enforcement.3 Conversely, the 
introduction of intentional or subjective elements—that is, aspects of a prohibition that focus on the 
actual or presumed intentionality behind the infringement—poses complex questions of assessment of 
such intent in relation to the public administration and corporate entities.  
Furthermore, it is also unclear whether these elements aim to be used to stress the traditional 
punitive (criminal) law principle of mens rea—with the necessary adaptation to corporate liability4—
or if they are rather used as threshold-concepts or flexibility clauses within EU economic law 
prohibitions, thus aimed at modulating evidentiary requirements and to create scope for proportionality 
assessments whereby the subjective requirement is mainly aimed at the creation of some leeway within 
the prohibition,5 but not so much oriented at the establishment of a requirement to assess the actual 
‘corporate’ state of mind. The latter use of subjective elements would equate to the creation of a dual 
route to a de minimis exception to prevent the enforcement of EU economic law against the public 
administration and corporate entities by allowing them to avoid liability for substantive (ie not de 
minimis) infringements on the basis of their subjective position—which would be difficult to reconcile 
with either the explicit existence of de minimis exceptions for specific types of behaviour (of private 
entities),6 or the margin of tolerance already created in terms of public (State) liability, which only arises 
in instances of a sufficiently serious breach of EU law (by the public administration).7 In other words, 
using subjective elements as proportionality devices would allow addresses of EU economic law 
prohibitions two bites of the cherry, as they could defend their behaviour both on the grounds that it did 
not generate sufficiently serious or appreciable (detrimental) effects, or that it was not intended (or 
both). These difficulties derived from the inclusion of subjective clauses in EU economic law provisions 
                                                          
1 For discussion of broader implications, see K A Armstrong, ‘The Character of EU Law and Governance: From 
“Community Method” to New Modes of Governance’ (2011) 64 (1) Current Legal Problems 179. 
2 See: J Tallberg, ‘Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union’ (2002) 56 (3) 
International Organization 609. 
3 For discussion, see R de la Feria, ‘Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law: The Creation of a New General 
Principle of EC Law through Tax’ (2008) 45 (2) Common Market Law Review 395. 
4 For extended discussion, see D Brodowski et al (eds), Regulating Corporate Criminal Liability (Springer, 2014). 
In the UK, the identification principle is used to impute to the company ‘the acts and state of mind’ of those who 
represent the directing mind, see Crown Prosecution Service, Legal Guidance on Corporate Prosecutions, 
available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/corporate_prosecutions/#a07, accessed 11 April 2016. 
5 For a similar discussion in the area of US antitrust law, see R Cass and K Hylton, ‘Antitrust Intent’ (2001) 
Regulatory Policy Program Working Paper RPP-2001-12, available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-
rcbg/research/rpp/RPP-2001-12.pdf, accessed 11 April 2016. 
6 See below (n 75) and accompanying text. 
7 For discussion, see K Schiemann, ‘The State’s Liability in Damages for Administrative Action’ (2011) 33(5) 
Fordham International Law Journal 1548-1563. See also further discussion below §V.B. 
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can seriously threaten legal certainty and diminish their effectiveness and thus deserve some careful 
consideration.  
As has been rightly pointed out, ‘important decisions within the spheres of economic and social 
law are taken by governments, companies or other collective or non-natural decision-makers. To speak 
of the “intent” of such bodies is to run the risk of anthropomorphism’; and, consequently, ‘it is more 
common to understand economic and social EU law in terms of effects’.8 In the end, ‘[d]eterminations 
of collective intention are always constructions … the very notion of collective intention requires some 
degree of extrapolation from the facts’.9 Therefore, the inclusion of subjective elements in EU economic 
law prohibitions necessarily requires a circumstantial analysis and an effects-based approach to the 
assessment of the behaviour of any collective entity,10 and in particular the public administration.11 In 
other words, subjective or intentional elements need to be ‘objectified’, so that EU economic law can 
be enforced to an adequate standard of legal certainty. This is the point of departure of this paper, which 
reflects about the role of subjective or intentional elements in EU economic law prohibitions, 
particularly in relation to rules addressed to the public administration. From a normative perspective, it 
stresses how, on the whole, it is desirable to suppress the need for an assessment of subjective intent 
and to proceed with an objectified enforcement of such prohibitions. In order to do so, and from a 
positive perspective, the paper explores the existing case law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) in several areas of EU economic law to assess to what extent it is possible to rely on an 
‘objectified’ analysis of intentional elements in their core prohibitions and, in particular, to rely on an 
objective assessment of the effects and the circumstances surrounding breaches of EU economic law 
by the public administration. 
It is submitted that this discussion is interesting for a number of reasons. Other than the 
implications for the design of EU economic law in a manner that increases its enforceability, the analysis 
of the treatment of subjective intent of the public administration by the CJEU may reveal interesting 
trends. The CJEU has not given a general ruling on the meaning of intent applicable for the whole of 
EU law and its approach has been piecemeal, dependent on the specific area of EU law where the 
interpretation of subjective elements was required. It has been stressed that ‘taking the criminal law 
perspective as a starting point could lead to decisions that are not in accordance with the goals of both 
administrative and tax laws’,12 thus justifying a different approach depending on the specific area of 
law under consideration. This comes to support the thesis advanced in this paper as far as an 
‘objectified’ assessment of intent in EU economic law applicable to the public administration deviates 
from the canon of interpretation of intent under criminal law. It is submitted that assessing the behaviour 
of the public administration diverges from the assessment of private corporate entities due to, at least, 
                                                          
8 G Davies, ‘Discrimination and beyond in European Economic and Social Law’ (2011) 18 Maastricht Journal of 
European & Comparative Law 7, 13-14. For a very clear criticism based on the situation in the United States, see 
TR Tyler and A Mentovich, ‘Punishing Collective Entities’ (2010) 19 (1) Journal of Law and Policy 203. 
9 A Ristroph, ‘State Intentions and the Law of Punishment’ (2008) 98 (4) Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 1353, 1366. 
10 As mentioned (n 4), this discussion is somehow related to the issue of imputation of criminal liability to 
corporate entities or, more closely, the imputability of infringements of competition law (as further discussed 
below, §IV). On the imputation of criminal liability to corporate entities, see eg A Foerschler, ‘Corporate Criminal 
Intent: Toward a Better Understanding of Corporate Misconduct’ (1990) 78 (5) California Law Review 1287-311; 
and CMV Clarkson, ‘Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning Their Souls’ (1996) 59 (4) Modern Law Review 
557-72.  
11 However, many of the considerations are equally, or at least largely applicable to an assessment of corporate 
behaviour for the purposes of applying EU economic law prohibitions to undertakings. 
12 JM ten Voorde, ‘The Concept of Intent in Rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union’ (2015) 21 (3) 
European Public Law 555, 564. 
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two influential elements. First, the duty for the public administration to act in strict compliance with the 
law as part of the right/duty of good administration recognised in Article 41 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter)13 and its implications in terms of legal compliance 
by public authorities, particularly in cases where EU law allows them to exercise discretion (see further 
discussion below §V). Second, due to the existence of varying forms of a presumption of legality of the 
acts of the public administration in the legal order of several Member States.14  
It is further submitted that assessing the behaviour of the public administration also deviates 
from any analysis of legislative or Parliamentary intention, at least in one basic functional aspect. The 
analysis of Parliamentary intention in some EU domestic systems (such as the UK)15 is aimed at 
clarifying the scope of the rules that the courts must apply16—or, in some settings, to determine whether 
specific legal situations fall within the scope of Parliamentary discretion in terms of the State’s margin 
of appreciation of complex issues.17 Parliamentary intention is, ultimately, a requirement linked to its 
supremacy and a legal device to reign in judicial activism.18 The assessment of the intention of the 
public administration does not serve the same purpose. The public administration is not meant to operate 
on the basis of subjective assessments, but rather of objective policy directions. Where it has discretion, 
the public administration must exercise it in an objective manner or, in other words, it has the duty to 
act in accordance with the general principle of objectivity.19 
In any case, even if these distinctions between the assessment of the behaviour of the public 
administration from, on the one hand, that of legislative branches of the State and, on the other hand, 
private entities were not persuasive, it is also clear that intent has not featured in a prominent manner 
in the case law of the CJEU applicable to wither. Indeed, the CJEU has been reluctant to engage in 
subjective assessments and has pushed for their objectification in litigation that concerned disputes 
between the EU Institutions and Member States,20 or which required an assessment of the purpose of 
certain interventions by Member States that could have triggered issues concerning their intention, lato 
                                                          
13 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] OJ C 83/389. 
14 For discussion, see R Caranta, ‘Evolving Patterns and Change in the EU Governance and their Consequences 
on Judicial Protection’ in R Caranta and A Gerbrandy (eds), Traditions and Change in European Administrative 
Law (Europa Law Publishing, 2011) 15. 
15 For a broader perspective, see K Hayne AC, ‘Statutes, Intentions and the Courts: What Place Does the Notion 
of Intention (Legislative or Parliamentary) Have in Statutory Construction? (2013) 13(2) Oxford University 
Commonwealth Law Journal 271-282. 
16 For discussion, see SC Styles, ‘The Rule of Parliament: Statutory Interpretation after Pepper v Hart’ (1994) 
14(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 151-158. 
17 For related discussion, see A Kavanagh, ‘Proportionality and Parliamentary Debate: Exploring Some Forbidden 
Territory’ (2014) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1-37; and ibid, ‘The Role of Parliamentary Intention in 
Adjudication under the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2006) 26(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 179-206. 
18 For discussion, see J McGarry, ‘Intention, Supremacy and Judicial Review’ (2013) 2(1) The Theory and 
Practice of Legislation 255-276; and B Dickson, ‘Activism and Restraint within the UK Supreme Court’ (2015) 
21(1) European Journal of Current Legal Issues, available at http://webjcli.org/article/view/399/515, accessed 11 
April 2016. 
19 European Commission, Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/code/_docs/code_en.pdf. See also European Ombudsman, The European Code 
of Good Administrative Behaviour, available at 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/resources/code.faces#/page/1, both accessed 11 April 2016. 
20 For instance, where issues of EU competence and its possible abuse were discussed, such as in the famous 
Tobacco advertising case. See Germany v Parliament and Council, C-380/03, EU:C:2006:772, paras 32-34. For 
discussion, stressing that “the Court chose not to place any reliance on the subjective views of the political 
institutions in drafting and ultimately adopting the measure”, see S Weatherill, ‘The Limits of Legislative 
Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the Court’s Case Law has become a “Drafting Guide”’ 
(2011) 12 (3) German Law Journal 827-864. 
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sensu.21 In these cases, the CJEU has avoided engaging in any subjective assessment and has resorted 
to an objective appraisal of the circumstances surrounding the behaviour giving rise to the dispute. In 
litigation between undertakings, the CJEU has also retreated from the need to assess subjective elements 
in many important areas, such as trade mark law.22 Therefore, the general approach has indeed been to 
understand economic and social EU law in terms of effects. It is submitted that this general approach 
by the CJEU has been fundamentally oriented towards ensuring the effectiveness of EU law through a 
narrow interpretation of prohibition clauses and general arguments based on subjective intention that 
could erode it, which may have resulted in more consistency than one could expect from the CJEU.23 
On that note focused on the effet utile of EU economic law, it is worth stressing that the 
establishment and assessment of subjective elements has been particularly controversial in the shaping 
of the doctrine of abuse of EU law,24 where the CJEU has progressively abandoned strict analyses of 
direct ‘intention’ and moved towards ‘objectified’, contextual assessments of the behaviour of 
undertakings and corporate entities25—ie, towards the use of presumptions and objective criteria to 
assess the potentially abusive intention of legal persons.26 This interpretive strategy contributes to 
promote legal certainty and effectiveness in the enforcement of EU economic law. However, it also 
raises the broader issue of the relevance and role of such subjective elements, as well as the practical 
viability of their continued inclusion in EU economic law prohibitions. Given that the CJEU objectifies 
the assessment of such intentional elements in cases of alleged abuse of EU law, can such 
‘objectification’ of the prohibition also be carried on to the analysis of ‘regular’ infringement allegations 
where no such abusive element is present? Is the introduction of the subjective element superfluous and 
it should simply be disregarded; or is it aimed at playing a moderating or attenuating role in the 
enforcement of the core prohibitions where such ‘objectified’ assessment of intention is required? What 
are the practical implications of the tension between, on the one hand, the inclusion of subjective 
elements by the EU legislator in EU economic law prohibitions and, on the other hand, their 
objectification by the CJEU in their interpretation and application? 
                                                          
21 Remarkably, the dispute in Henn and Darby, C-34/79, EU:C:1979:295, where the CJEU used the expression 
‘disguised restriction of trade’, but avoided a direct assessment of the intention of the United Kingdom. See PJ 
Oliver, Oliver on Free Movement of Goods in the European Union, 5th ed (Hart, 2010) 8.20. 
22 See, generally, the discussion following Centrafarm, C-3/78, EU:C:1978:174, which was criticised for the 
apparent creation of a subjective test later abandoned; P Torremans, Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property 
Law, 7th ed (Oxford University Press, 2013) 527. See also C Baden-Fuller, ‘Economic Issues Relating to Property 
Rights in Trademarks: Export Bans, Differential Pricing, Restrictions on Resale and Repackaging’ (1981) 6 (3) 
European Law Review 162-179. 
23 For a critical view, see H de Waele, ‘The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Integration Process: A 
Contemporary and Normative Assessment’ (2010) 6(1) Hanse Law Review 3-26. 
24 For extended discussion, see A Saydé, Abuse of EU Law and Regulation of the Internal Market (Hart, 2014) 
and the contributions to R de la Feria and S Vogenauer, Prohibition of Abuse of Law—A New General Principle 
of EU Law? (Hart, 2011). 
25 See A Bobić, Prohibition of Abuse of Rights in the EU (2011) LLM Thesis, University of Zagreb, available at 
https://www.pravo.unizg.hr/_download/repository/Bobic_thesis_final.pdf, accessed 5 August 2015. 
26 Ibid, 14 and ff. See also A Lenaerts, ‘The General Principle of the Prohibition of Abuse of Rights: A Critical 
Position on Its Role in a Codified European Contract Law’ (2010) 18 (6) European Review of Private Law 1121; 
and K E Sørensen, ‘Abuse of Rights in Community Law: A Principle of Substance or Merely Rhetoric?’ (2006) 
43 (2) Common Market Law Review 423. This interpretive strategy was proposed by Advocate General Lenz in 
TV10 v Commissariaat voor de Media, C-23/93, EU:C:1994:251, paras 61 and 65-66. It has been applied in 
particularly clear terms by the CJEU in Halifax and Others, C-255/02, EU:C:2006:121, para 75. Recently, see 
Slancheva sila, C-434/12, EU:C:2013:546, paras 39 and 41. See also Commission v Hungary, C-115/13, 
EU:C:2014:253, para 33. Interestingly, the same type of assessment has been applied to disputes between Member 
States where arguments regarding potential abuses of EU law were raised; see Hungary v Slovakia, C-364/10, 
EU:C:2012:630, paras 56-62. 
5 
These issues are particularly relevant when it comes to the enforcement of EU economic law 
against the State and its emanations because the assessment of intent of such entities is even more 
complex than in relation to undertakings or corporate agents for the reasons set out above.This triggers 
the need to explore in detail how to assess subjective elements in core prohibitions of EU economic law 
applicable to the public sector, or which require direct intervention by a public administration.27 In line 
with previous considerations and the development of the doctrine of abuse of EU law by private legal 
entities, it is submitted that a plausible thesis is that such assessment also needs to be ‘objectified’ and 
that the intention of the State and its emanations needs to be assessed by a mix of presumptions and 
recourse to objective criteria that allow for a contextual analysis of the behaviour deemed to breach EU 
law. 
Building on this normative position, this paper looks at public procurement and State aid rules 
as two examples of areas of EU economic law subjected to interpretative and enforcement difficulties 
due to the introduction, sometimes veiled, of subjective elements in their main prohibitions (§II and 
§III). The paper then establishes parallels with other areas of EU economic law, such as antitrust, non-
discrimination law or the rules governing the imposition of financial sanctions for infringements of the 
common agricultural policy, and seeks benchmarks to support the main thesis that such intentional 
elements need to be ‘objectified’, so that EU economic law can be enforced against the public 
administration to an adequate standard of legal certainty (§IV). The paper draws on the case law of the 
CJEU to support such ‘objectification’ of intentional elements in EU economic law, and highlights how 
the Court has been engaging in such an interpretative strategy for quite a long time. It then goes on to 
explore the interplay between such an approach and more general protections against behaviour of a 
public administration in breach of EU law: ie the right to good administration in Article 41 Charter, and 
the doctrine of State liability for infringement of EU law (§V). The paper concludes with the normative 
recommendation that the main prohibitions of EU economic law should be free from subjective 
elements focused on the intention of the public administration. (§VI). 
II. ASSESSMENT OF INTENT UNDER EU PUBLIC PROCUREMENT RULES 
Public procurement is an area where EU law has developed an increasingly prescriptive regulatory 
framework that imposes significant restrictions on Member States’ discretion to organise their activities 
as public purchasers.28 The CJEU has unambiguously declared that procurement ‘legislation contains 
fundamental rules of EU law … intended to ensure the application of the principles of equal treatment 
of tenderers and of transparency in order to open up undistorted competition in all the Member 
States’,29 and repeatedly stressed that the purpose of the procurement directives ‘is to develop effective 
competition in the field of public contracts’.30 This has led to a significant body of case law that sketches 
the obligations that Member States have to comply with in the process leading to the award of a public 
                                                          
27 Cf I Baciu, ‘The “Abuse of Rights” in Light of the CJEU Case Law: A Radiography of Decision C-434/12’ 
(2014) 9 (2) European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review 138. 
28 See S Arrowsmith, ‘The Past and Future Evolution of EC Public Procurement Law: From Framework to 
Common Code?’ (2005–2006) 35 Public Contract Law Journal 337; ibid, ‘The Purpose of the EU Procurement 
Directives: Ends, Means and the Implications for National Regulatory Space for Commercial and Horizontal 
Procurement Policies’ (2011-2012) 14 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 1. 
29 Impresa Pizzarotti, C-213/13 EU:C:2014:2067, para 63, with reference to Commission v Portugal, C-70/06, 
EU:C:2008:3, para 40; Mikhaniki, C-213/07, EU:C:2008:731, para 55; Commission v Cyprus, C-251/09, 
EU:C:2011:84, paras 37 to 39; and Manova, C-336/12, EU:C:2013:647, para 28. 
30 Hochtief and Linde-Kca-Dresden, C-138/08, EU:C:2009:627, para 47, with references to Fracasso and 
Leitschutz, C-27/98, EU:C:1999:420, para 26; Lombardini and Mantovani, C-285/99 and C-286/99, 
EU:C:2001:640, para 34; Universale-Bau, C-470/99, EU:C:2002:746, para 89; and Sintesi, C-247/02, 
EU:C:2004:593, para 35. 
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contract, particularly in order to avoid distortions of competition based on discrimination and 
favouritism or, more generally, on the use of public procurement as a regulatory tool.31 Those 
obligations are not limited by the specific regime developed in the subsequent generations of public 
procurement Directives, but extend beyond their scope of application and impose direct duties that 
derive from the general principles of EU law.32 In that regard, the case law of the CJEU clearly shows 
how competition considerations limit Member States’ discretion in the award of public contracts, and 
it is plagued with examples of Member States’ circumvention of such pro-competitive requirements.33 
In the existing case law, the CJEU has not given any relevant weight to the intention of the contracting 
authorities (see further discussion below §II.A). 
Recently, though, Article 18(1) of Directive 2014/24 has consolidated the principle of 
competition amongst the general principles of the EU public procurement system.34 This provision 
offers direct normative support to restrict Member States’ contracting authorities’ discretion in the 
award of public contracts if the exercise of such discretion has a negative impact on competition, either 
for the specific contract or, more generally, in the market.35 However, the drafting of the principle of 
competition in Article 18(1) of Directive 2014/24 has introduced a subjective element in the analysis 
by determining that ‘[t]he design of the procurement shall not be made with the intention … of 
artificially narrowing competition’. This was not the original drafting of the principle in the 2011 
proposal by the European Commission,36 which aimed to consolidate the principle in the following 
terms: ‘The design of the procurement shall not be made with the objective […] of artificially narrowing 
competition’.37 Unfortunately, even after a review of the travaux preparatoires, the reasons behind this 
change in the drafting of the principle of competition remain a mystery.38 The Council altered the 
Commission’s proposal without offering any explanations,39 which results in a clear need to engage in 
an interpretive exercise that goes beyond a contained construction of the principle within the limits of 
the Directive itself. 
                                                          
31 For extended discussion, see A Sanchez Graells, ‘Truly Competitive Public Procurement as a Europe 2020 
Lever: What Role for the Principle of Competition in Moderating Horizontal Policies?’ (2016) European Public 
Law Journal, forthcoming. 
32 C Risvig Hansen, Contracts Not Covered or Not Fully Covered by the Public Sector Directive (DJØF, 2012). 
33 The issue is particularly clear when it comes to the case law on the undue recourse to negotiated and other less 
than fully-competitive procedures. For discussion, see A Sanchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU 
Competition Rules, 2nd ed (Hart, 2015) 258-80. 
34 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L 94/65. 
35 For a first attempt to the interpretation of this principle, see A Sanchez Graells, ‘Public Procurement: A 2015 
Updated Overview of EU and National Case Law’ (2015) eCompetitions 40647; and ibid (n 33) 207-14. Cf 
Arrowmisth, Purpose of the EU Procurement Directives (n 28), and P Kunzlik, ‘Neoliberalism and the European 
Public Procurement Regime’ (2012-2013) 15 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 283. 
36 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on public 
procurement, 20 December 2011, COM(2011) 896 final, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0896:FIN:EN:PDF, accessed 5 August 2015. 
37 This intentional element is common to different language versions of the Directive: ‘intención’ (Spanish), 
‘intention’ (French), ‘intento’ (Italian), ‘intuito’ (Portuguese) or ‘Absicht’ (German). Thus, it cannot be justified 
as a deficiency in translation or an error in the wording of the provision 
38 See Presidency compromise text of 24 July 2012, 12878/12, 2011/0438 (COD), available at 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12878-2012-INIT/en/pdf, accessed 9 December 2015. 
39 Art 15. For discussion of the legislative process that led to such alteration of the drafting, see A Sanchez Graells, 
‘A Deformed Principle of Competition? The Subjective Drafting of Article 18(1) of Directive 2014/24’ in GS 
Ølykke and A Sanchez Graells (eds), Reformation or Deformation of the EU Public Procurement Rules (Edward 
Elgar) forthcoming. See also ibid, ‘Public Procurement and Competition: Some Challenges Arising from Recent 
Developments in EU Public Procurement Law’ in C Bovis (ed), Research Handbook on EU Public Procurement 
Law, Research Handbooks in European Law Series (Edward Elgar, 2016). 
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The literal wording of Article 18(1) of Directive 2014/24 thus creates the difficulty of assessing 
the intention of the contracting authority—which, by definition, is a legal entity that either forms part 
of the public sector of a Member State, including its emanations (ie bodies governed by public law), or 
is an entity that receives more than 50% of the funding for the specific procurement from the public 
sector.40 Indeed, Article 18(1) provides a formulation of the principle of competition in which the 
subjective or intentional element of any restriction of competition is emphasized. This intentional 
element is common to different language versions of the Directive,41 so it cannot be justified as a 
deficiency in translation or an error in the wording of the provision. The recitals of the Directive do not 
provide any clarification either and, ultimately, this provision can open the door to complex problems 
of identification and attribution of intentional elements in the field of public procurement—which are 
exactly the sort of difficulties mentioned above (§I). In order to overcome such interpretative 
difficulties, it is worth ascertaining to what extent it is possible to rely on an ‘objectification’ of the 
analysis of intentional elements in the existing case law of the CJEU in the area of EU public 
procurement. 
A. ‘Objectified’ Assessment of Intent in Public Procurement Case Law 
Before the adoption of Directive 2014/24, there had been other sorts of prohibitions in the public 
procurement setting that included an ‘intentional element’, such as the traditional prohibition of 
calculating the value of the contract in a way that makes it remain below the value thresholds that trigger 
the application of the EU public procurement Directives and, ultimately, allows the contracting 
authority to avoid them. Under the applicable rules, it is clear that ‘[t]he choice of the method used to 
calculate the estimated value of a procurement shall not be made with the intention of excluding it from 
the scope of this Directive’ and, in particular, that a ‘procurement shall not be subdivided with the effect 
of preventing it from falling within the scope of this Directive, unless justified by objective reasons’.42 
In that regard, it is important to stress that the CJEU departed from the literal wording of that 
provision—which requires an intentional element identical to that of Article 18(1) of Directive 
2014/24—and clearly adopted an objective assessment based on the effects and consequences of the 
contracting authorities’ decisions concerning the estimation of the value of contracts that should have 
been tendered under the applicable EU rules. In a consistent line of case law, the CJEU stressed that the 
analysis needs to be based on objective elements that create indicia of the intentional artificial split of 
the contract, such as ‘the simultaneous issuance of invitations to tender … similarities between contract 
notices, the initiation of contracts within a single geographical area and the existence of a single 
contracting authority’ all of which ‘provide additional evidence militating in favour of the view that, in 
actual fact, the separate works contracts relate to a single work’.43 Indeed, the intentional element has 
                                                          
40 See Articles 2(1) and 13 of Directive 2014/24. For discussion on the coverage of the Directive, see S 
Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement. Regulation in the EU and the UK, Vol. 1, 3rd ed (Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2014) 339-83. 
41 "Intención" (Spanish), "intention" (French), "intento" (Italian), "intuito" (Portuguese) or "Absicht" (German). 
42 See Article 5(3) of Directive 2014/24, which absorbed the content of Article 9(7) of Directive 2004/18 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of 
public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ L 134/114. Previously, see 
Article 6 of Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of procedures for the 
award of public works contracts [1993] OJ L 199/54. 
43 As stressed very recently, see Spain v Commission, T-384/10, EU:T:2013:277, paras 65-68 (emphasis added); 
the Judgment has, however, been set aside on appeal by CJEU on procedural issues (disregard of a time limit by 
the Commission); see Spain v Commission, C-429/13 P, EU:C:2014:2310. Nonetheless, the same wording had 
been used in Commission v France, C-16/98, EU:C:2000:541; Commission v Italy, joined cases C-187/04 and C-
188/04, EU:C:2005:652; Auroux and Others, C-220/05, EU:C:2007:31; and Commission v Germany, C-574/10, 
EU:C:2012:145. 
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been excluded where, on the basis of such analysis, there were objective reasons that justified the 
decision adopted by the contracting authority.44 Moreover, the prohibition of artificially splitting the 
contract with the intention of circumventing the application of the EU procurement rules has been 
applied directly to determine the incompatibility of legal rules that objectively diminished the 
applicability of the relevant directives, without engaging in any sort of subjective assessment (which 
would have been impossible).45 Therefore, it seems plain to conclude that, in the assessment of an 
identical (apparent) subjective element of intention, the CJEU has ‘objectified’ the test applicable to 
determine the existence of an eventual infringement of the EU public procurement directives.  
It is true that the CJEU has not gone as far as simply presuming the existence of the intention 
to avoid the applicability of the EU procurement rules in all cases. As aptly put by Advocate General 
Trstenjak, 
Although the Court is decidedly strict in its examination of that prohibition, such 
intention to circumvent cannot be presumed without more. Each individual case in which 
a contract was split for the purposes of an award must be examined according to its 
context and specificities and, in that regard, particular attention must be given to whether 
there are good reasons pointing in favour of or, on the contrary, against the split ...46 
However, the need to carry out a case by case analysis does not detract from the fact that the 
CJEU has excluded any consideration of the subjective intention of the contracting authority or any of 
its members. This was made exceedingly clear in a recent Judgment, whereby the General Court (GC) 
stressed that 
a finding that a contract has been split in breach of European Union procurement 
legislation does not require proof of a subjective intention to circumvent the application 
of the provisions contained therein … it is irrelevant whether the infringement is the 
result of intention or negligence on the part of the Member State responsible, or of 
technical difficulties encountered by it … the Court considered that for the purpose of 
finding [an infringement] it was not necessary … to show beforehand that the Member 
State concerned intended to circumvent the obligations … by splitting the contract.47 
Overall, thus, when it comes to the assessment of the seemingly subjective element included in 
the anti-circumvention provisions in the successive generations of procurement Directives, the existing 
case law of the CJEU clearly established that the analysis solely needs to be conducted on the basis of 
objective evidence and arguments regarding two aspects: firstly, whether objectively the conduct of the 
contracting authority created the effect proscribed by the rule and, secondly, whether there were 
objective good reasons for such behaviour (ie, an alternative explanation to the then presumed intention 
to circumvent). It could not be more objective and, clearly, no further proof of a subjective intention to 
circumvent the application of the EU public procurement rules is required. 
The same line of reasoning can be found in cases dealing more generally with infringements of 
specific obligations concerning the choice of particular procurement procedures. Generally, contracting 
                                                          
44 Swoboda, C-411/00, EU:C:2002:660, paras 57-60. 
45 Commission v Italy, C-412/04, EU:C:2008:102, paras 72-74. 
46 Opinion of AG Trstenjak in Commission v Germany, C-271/08, EU:C:2010:183, para 165 (emphasis added and 
references omitted). cf Opinion of AG Jacobs in Commission v France, C-16/98, EU:C:2000:99, para 38, where 
the AG stresses that the intentional or subjective element cannot be eliminated, but suggests that the applicable 
test still lies on whether the decision under assessment can be ‘justified on objective grounds’. 
47 Spain v Commission, T-384/10, EU:T:2013:277, para 95 (references omitted). 
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authorities have shown a clear tendency towards abusing the grounds that authorise resorting to non-
competitive procedures and, in particular, negotiated procedures without prior publication of contract 
notices48—which allow them to proceed to a direct award of the contract, with the exclusion of any 
competition therefor. Given the gravity of such violation of the EU public procurement rules, if they 
entered into a direct award in violation of the limited grounds that authorised such non-competitive 
procedure, the contract would be declared ineffective under the applicable remedies Directive.49 
One way of avoiding the ineffectiveness of those contracts would be for contracting authorities 
to publish voluntary transparency notices disclosing the reasons why they considered that such direct 
award was lawful. This possibility has also proven controversial and contracting authorities have been 
accused of using it strategically, with the intention of avoiding the ineffectiveness of contracts that they 
knew (or ought to have known) that they were directly awarding in contravention of the applicable 
rules. This gave rise to a recent case before the CJEU, where Advocate General Bot proposed a stringent 
test whereby the protection derived from the publication of the voluntary transparency notice would 
only be declined if ‘the contracting authority has deliberately and intentionally infringed the rules on 
advertising and competitive procedure’.50 This would have, once more, created a problematic test based 
on subjective elements privy to the contracting authority. However, the CJEU rejected the test proposed 
by AG Bot and ruled that 
the review body is under a duty to determine whether, when the contracting authority 
took the decision to award a contract by means of a negotiated procedure without prior 
publication of a contract notice, it acted diligently and whether it could legitimately hold 
that the conditions laid down in [the Directive] were in fact satisfied.51 
Consequently, it seems clear that the interpretation of the conditions for the exception to the 
ineffectiveness to apply need to be restrictive and ultimately rely on objective tests, without any 
consideration being paid to the (presumed) intention of the contracting authority.52  
Finally, it is worth stressing that the intention of the contracting authority that enters into an 
illegal direct award has also been considered irrelevant even where the direct award is the supervening 
result of the privatisation of the public entity with which the agreement was initially concluded.53 In 
that case, the CJEU ruled that  
by means of an artificial construction comprising several distinct stages, namely the 
establishment of [the company], the conclusion of the … contract with that company and 
                                                          
48 Such grounds need to be interpreted strictly, as repeatedly stressed by the CJEU. See Commission v Italy, 
199/85, EU:C:1987:115, para 14; Commission v Italy, C-57/94, EU:C:1995:150, para 23; Commission v Germany, 
C-318/94, EU:C:1996:149, para 13; Commission v Germany, joined cases C-20/01 and C-28/01, EU:C:2003:220, 
para 58; Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau, C-26/03, EU:C:2005:5, para 46; and Commission v Germany, C-480/06, 
EU:C:2009:357, paras 34-35. 
49 See Art 2d of Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and 
public works contracts, as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC. Consolidated version available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1989L0665:20080109:en:PDF, accessed 5 August 
2015. 
50 Opinion of AG Bot in Fastweb, C-19/13, EU:C:2014:266, paras 16, 92, 100 and 115 (emphasis added). 
51 Fastweb, C-19/13, EU:C:2014:2194, para 50 (emphasis added). See A Brown, ‘When Will Publication of a 
Voluntary Ex Ante Transparency Notice Provide Protection against the Remedy of Contract Ineffectiveness? Case 
C-19/13 Ministero Dell'interno v Fastweb Spa’ (2015) 24 (1) Public Procurement Law Review NA10. 
52 See R Caranta, ‘Remedies in EU Public Contract Law: The Proceduralisation of EU Public Procurement 
Legislation’ (2015) 8 (1) Review of European Administrative Law 75, 83-84. 
53 Commission v Austria (Mödling), C-29/04, EU:C:2005:670. 
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the transfer of 49% of its shares to [a private investor], a public service contract was 
awarded to a semi-public company 49% of the shares in which were held by a private 
undertaking … the award of that contract must be examined taking into account all those 
stages as well as their purpose and not on the basis of their strictly chronological order 
… To examine … the award of the public contract at issue only from the standpoint of 
the date on which it took place, without taking account of the effects of the transfer within 
a very short period of 49% of the shares … would prejudice the effectiveness of [the 
public procurement] Directive.54 
Once more, this supports an interpretation of the existing case law as providing strong support 
to ‘objectifying’ the analysis of subjective elements in public procurement rules, which would 
ultimately result in an objective assessment of the decision adopted by the contracting authority.55 
B. An ‘Objectified’ Interpretation of Article 18(1) of Directive 2014/24 
The case law of the CJEU regarding the anti-circumvention provisions in the successive generations of 
procurement Directives (above §II.A) provides strong support for an ‘objectified’ interpretation of 
Article 18(1) of Directive 2014/24. Regardless of its literal wording, it is submitted that the only avenue 
to approach the interpretation and enforcement of Article 18(1) of Directive 2014/24 in a possibilistic 
and pragmatic manner is to derive the element of intention to restrict or distort competition (ie, to 
artificially narrow it) from a reasonable objective assessment of the concurring circumstances, so that 
intention is inferred or derived from the effects or consequences of the way in which the procurement 
procedure is designed and carried out by the contracting authority. In the end, the context in which the 
distortions or restrictions of competition take place will be a determinant for their existence and little 
else identifiable can give meaning to the (implicit) intention of the contracting authority to artificially 
narrow down competition. 
Such ‘objectification’ of the principle of competition consolidated in Article 18(1) of Directive 
2014/24 should be carried out by establishing a rebuttable presumption of restrictive intent in cases 
where, in fact, the tendering procedure has been designed in a manner that is in fact restrictive of 
competition. The disproval of this rebuttable presumption would require the contracting authority or 
entity to justify the existence of objective, legitimate and proportionate reasons for the adoption of the 
criteria restrictive of competition56—ie, to provide a plausible justification on objective grounds for the 
imposition of restrictive conditions of competition in tendering the contract, so as to exclude the plain 
and simple explanation that it was otherwise simply intended to restrict competition therewith.57 In other 
words, if it could be justified that a ‘reasonable and disinterested contracting entity’ (meaning free from 
                                                          
54 Ibid, paras 40-42. 
55 Similar tests have been proposed in relation to choice of procedures, which has always been limited by 
exhaustive lists of grounds; see S Arrowsmith and S Treumer, ‘Competitive Dialogue in EU law: a Critical 
Review’ in ibid (eds), Competitive Dialogue in EU Procurement (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 3, 46 (with 
reference to decisions made by a ‘reasonable contracting authority’); and P Telles and L Butler, ‘Public 
Procurement Award Procedures in Directive 2014/24/EU’ in F Lichère, R Caranta and S Treumer (eds) Novelties 
in the 2014 Directive on Public Procurement, vol. 6 European Procurement Law Series, (DJØF, 2014) 131, 146 
(who would nonetheless allow contracting authorities to make subjective assessments). 
56 This is the approach to the enforcement of the prohibition of Article 102 TFEU in cases of predatory pricing. 
For discussion, see below §IV.A. 
57 Similarly, this was the interpretation presented by the Commission when the rule preventing the artificial split 
of contracts was first assessed; see European Commission, Guide to the Community Rules on Public Works 
Contracts other than in the Water, Energy, Transport and Telecommunications Sectors (Directive 93/37/EEC) 
(1993) 17, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/guidelines/works_en.pdf, 
accessed 5 August 2015.  
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any intent to restrict competition) would have taken the same decision on the design of the tender in a 
form restrictive of competition, the presumption of restrictive intent would not be applicable and, 
ultimately, the tender would be compliant with Article 18(1) of Directive 2014/24. Obviously, this test 
requires some further development and the CJEU will most likely have the opportunity to address these 
issues in the future. However, it is submitted that the discussion above shows that the CJEU has engaged 
in such interpretative strategy for quite a long time in the field of EU public procurement. As discussed 
below, very similar developments can be identified in the area of State aid. 
III. ASSESSMENT OF INTENT UNDER EU STATE AID RULES 
State aid is prohibited by Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
where a set of objective conditions are met.58 The enforcement of this prohibition has never taken into 
account the subjective intention of the Member State,59 and it is commonplace that the prohibition is 
enforced in an objective manner.60 The CJEU has repeatedly clarified that Art 107(1) TFEU ‘does not 
distinguish between the measures of State intervention concerned by reference to their causes or aims 
but defines them in relation to their effects’;61 or, even more clearly, that ‘Article 107(1) TFEU defines 
measures of State intervention in relation to their effects’.62 However, in a recent case involving a 
complex or two-part State aid measure, the issue of the actual intention of the Member State engaged 
in the alleged infringement of Article 107(1) TFEU was raised in a way that can shed some light on our 
discussion. 
In the case at hand, and in a simplified manner, Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Nyrt (MOL) and the 
Hungarian State entered into an authorisation agreement in 2005 whereby the mining rights assigned to 
MOL were extended and the mining fees payable in consideration for those rights were determined on 
a non-revisable basis for the period 2005-2020. Later, a 2008 legal reform significantly increased the 
mining fees that would have been payable for the exploitation of those same fields. However, in view 
of the 2005 agreement, MOL was exempted from topping up the mining fees it was liable to pay. 
Competitors of MOL and potential new entrants were subject to the revised higher fees. Unsurprisingly, 
the European Commission took the view that, given the way the 2005 agreement and the provisions of 
the 2008 amendment had been designed, they should be regarded as part of the same measure and it 
concluded that their combined effect conferred an unfair advantage to MOL. According to the 
Commission, even if the 2005 agreement was concluded in accordance with the Mining Act then in 
force and even if it was up to the Member State to set the mining fees, the cumulative effects produced 
by both measures were not necessarily compatible with the State aid rules of the TFEU—even if, taken 
in isolation, neither the 2005 agreement nor the 2008 amendment were contrary to these rules. 
                                                          
58 C Quigley, European State Aid Law and Policy, 3rd ed (Hart, 2015) 3-52; K Bacon, European Union Law of 
State Aid, 2nd ed (Oxford University Press, 2013) 19-90. See also the draft Commission Notice on the notion of 
State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU, 17 January 2014, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2014_state_aid_notion/draft_guidance_en.pdf, accessed 5 August 
2015. 
59 L Hancher, T Ottervanger and PJ Slot, EU State Aids, 4th ed (Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) 53. 
60 P Craig and G De Búrca, EU Law. Texts, Cases and Materials, 6th ed (Oxford, 2015) 1133. 
61 See Italy v Commission, 173/73, EU:C:1974:71, para 13. See also France v Commission, C-241/94, 
EU:C:1996:353, and France v Commission, C-251/97, EU:C:1999:480. Recently, see Spain v Commission, C-
409/00, EU:C:2003:92, para 46. 
62 Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom v Commission and Others, C-399/10 P, EU:C:2013:175, para 102. See also 
Commission v EDF and Others, C-124/10 P, EU:C:2012:318, para 77 and the case-law cited. For discussion, see 
A Sanchez Graells, ‘Bringing the “Market Economy Agent” Principle to Full Power’ (2012) 33 (10) European 
Competition Law Review 35. 
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The Commission considered that the measure fulfilled the criteria enshrined in Article 107(1) 
TFEU and should be considered as State aid, and that there was nothing to indicate that it could be 
compatible with the internal market. The Hungarian authorities challenged the Commission's position 
before the GC arguing that the measure did not constitute State aid because the 2005 agreement 
conferred MOL no advantage and was not selective. Addressing this point of law, the GC embarked 
upon an analysis whereby the intention of the Hungarian authorities would have been determinative of 
the outcome of the case. In view of the GC, 
for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU, a single aid measure may consist of combined 
elements on condition that, having regard to their chronology, their purpose and the 
circumstances of the undertaking at the time of their intervention, they are so closely 
linked to each other that they are inseparable from one another (see, to that effect, Joined 
Cases C-399/10 P and C-401/10 P Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom v Commission and 
Others and Commission v France and Others [2013] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 103 and 
104). In that context, a combination of elements such as that relied upon by the 
Commission in the contested decision may be categorised as State aid where the State 
acts in such a way as to protect one or more operators already present on the market, by 
concluding with them an agreement granting them fee rates guaranteed for the entire 
duration thereof, whilst having the intention at that time of subsequently exercising its 
regulatory power, by increasing the fee rate so that other market operators are placed at 
a disadvantage, be they operators already present on the market on the date on which the 
agreement was concluded or new operators.63 
Once more, this would have created the need to assess a subjective element in the granting of 
State aid. The Commission strongly criticised this Judgment of the GC and challenged it on the basis 
that it disregarded the settled case-law of the CJEU to the effect that ‘Article 107(1) TFEU defines State 
interventions on the basis of their effects, and independently of the techniques used by the Member 
States to implement their interventions’.64 As commented elsewhere, in my view, if Article 107(1) 
TFEU is meant to avoid distortions of competition in the internal market, when confronted with 
sequential, two-part or complex aid measures, the fact that they all formed part of a ‘master plan’ from 
the outset or are the ‘random or supervening’ result of discrete interventions should be irrelevant. 
Otherwise, the burden of proving ‘distortive intent’ by the granting Member State from the outset may 
simply have made it impossible to pursue these cases.65  
On appeal, the CJEU disagreed with the GC—or, more correctly, reinterpreted the reasoning 
of the GC—and stressed the irrelevance of the intention of the Member State. According to the CJEU, 
the General Court merely applied the case-law laid down by the Court of Justice in the 
judgment in Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom v Commission and Others and 
Commission v France and Others (C-399/10 P and C-401/10 P, EU:C:2013:175), to 
which the General Court also expressly referred in paragraph 67 …, and according to 
                                                          
63 MOL v Commission, T-499/10, EU:T:2013:592, para 67 (emphasis added). 
64 Commission v MOL, C-15/14, EU:C:2015:362, para 86; with reference to inter alia, judgments in Belgium v 
Commission, C-56/93, EU:C:1996:64, para 79; Belgium v Commission, C-75/97, EU:C:1999:311, para 25; British 
Aggregates v Commission, C-487/06 P, EU:C:2008:757, para 89; and Commission v Government of Gibraltar 
and United Kingdom, C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P, EU:C:2011:732, paras 91, 92 and 98. 
65 A Sanchez Graells, ‘GC rules on two-part State aid measures and selectivity under Art 107(1) TFEU (T-
499/10)’, howtocrackanut, 12 November 2013, available at http://howtocrackanut.blogspot.co.uk/2013/11/gc-
rules-on-two-part-state-aid-measures.html, accessed 5 August 2015. 
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which, since State interventions take various forms and have to be assessed in relation to 
their effects, it cannot be excluded that several consecutive measures of State 
intervention must, for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU, be regarded as a single 
intervention. That could be the case, in particular when consecutive interventions, having 
regard to their chronology, their purpose and the circumstances of the undertaking at the 
time of those interventions, are so closely related to each other that they are inseparable 
from one another.66 
Even if it could have been clearer,67 with this sort of reinterpretation, the CJEU dispelled the 
possible creation of a subjective test in the assessment of State aid measures and, once more, provided 
support to the general thesis advanced in this paper—whereby subjective elements in core prohibitions 
of EU economic law applicable to the public sector, or which require direct intervention by a public 
administration, need to either be excluded; or, where existing, their assessment needs to be ‘objectified’, 
so that the intention of the State and its emanations is assessed by a mix of presumptions and objective 
criteria that allow for a contextual analysis of the behaviour deemed to breach EU law. This is not solely 
consistent with the case law of the CJEU in relation to public procurement (§II.A) and State aid (here, 
§III), but also comparable with the solutions given in other areas of EU economic law, which can serve 
as useful benchmarks, as discussed in the following section. 
IV. BENCHMARKS IN OTHER AREAS OF EU ECONOMIC LAW 
A. Coordination with the Enforcement of EU Antitrust Rules 
Beyond the support in the case law of the CJEU, the reasons for the ‘objectification’ of the assessment 
of subjective elements in core prohibitions of EU economic law applicable to the public sector, or which 
require direct intervention by a public administration, are multiple. Bearing in mind the need for 
consistency in different sets of rules concerned with the protection of undistorted competition in the 
market—as required by Article 3(3) of Treaty on European Union (TEU), Article 3(1)(b) TFEU and 
Protocol (27) TFEU—a rather compelling reason for such ‘objectification’ can be derived from 
systemic considerations and, ultimately, from the need for coordination with some ‘functional 
neighbours’. In particular, such coordination should take into account the objective character of the 
restrictions of competition derived from the TFEU and its interpretation by the CJEU. Indeed, the 
prohibitions in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU apply almost in absolute abstraction from any volitional 
element of the offending parties68—that is, undertakings infringing competition law can be sanctioned 
without them having ‘an intention actually to violate’ the applicable rules.69 This applies both to 
coordinated behaviour prohibited by Article 101 TFEU,70 and to unilateral behaviour prohibited by 
Article 102 TFEU—which enforcement has moved from early cases (eg on predatory pricing) where 
                                                          
66 Commission v MOL, EU:C:2015:362, para 97 (emphasis added). 
67 A Sanchez Graells, ‘CJEU implicitly rejects GC's views on subjective assessment of two-part State aid measures 
under Art 107(1) TFEU (C-15/14)’, howtocrackanut, 8 June 2015, available at 
http://howtocrackanut.blogspot.co.uk/2015/06/cjeu-implicitly-rejects-gcs-views-on.html, accessed 5 August 
2015. 
68 On the issue of the assessment of subjective intention for the purposes of enforcing Art 101 TFEU, see O Odudu, 
‘Interpreting Article 81(1): Object as Subjective Intention’ (2001) 26 European Law Review 60-75. For a 
comparative perspective, see also ibid, ‘The Role of Specific Intent in Section 1 of the Sherman Act: A Market 
Power Test?’ (2002) 25 World Competition 463-491. 
69 P Whelan, The Criminalization of European Cartel Enforcement (Oxford University Press, 2014) 86-89 and 
108-13. See also WPJ Wils, The Optimal Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law. Essays in Law & Economics (Kluwer, 
2002) 163-87; ibid, Efficiency and Justice in European Antitrust Enforcement (Hart, 2008) 157. 
70 A Jones, ‘Left Behind by Modernisation? Restrictions by Object under Article 101(1)’ (2010) 6 (3) European 
Competition Journal 649. 
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there were references to the value of intention of the dominant undertaking,71 towards a more effects-
based approach to its enforcement that is detached from the existence of any (predatory) intention.72 
Arguments regarding lack of subjective intention whereby the parties claim that they did not intend to 
restrict competition are not a valid defence and, ultimately, ‘the parties’ subjective intent cannot be 
relied upon to exculpate otherwise unlawful behaviour’.73 Indeed, the EU Courts have repeatedly upheld 
that 
for an infringement of the competition rules to be regarded as having been committed 
intentionally, it is not necessary for an undertaking to have been aware that it was 
infringing those rules; it is sufficient that it could not have been unaware that its conduct 
was aimed at restricting competition.74 
Hence, a competitive restriction in the market (almost) automatically results in a violation of 
those prohibitive norms, irrespective of the actual intention with which market players have conducted 
the practice restrictive of competition.75 It is remarkable that undertakings cannot escape the imposition 
of a fine even where the infringement has resulted from their erring as to the lawfulness of their conduct 
on account of the terms of legal advice given by a lawyer,76 which further erodes the existence of any 
meaningful subjective assessment at the stage of establishing an infringement of the EU antitrust 
prohibitions.77 The only exception will come where there was clearly no negligence in the oversight of 
the development of a market activity with potential competition-restricting effects,78 and where the 
                                                          
71 AKZO v Commission, C-62/86, EU:C:1991:286. For discussion, see L Philips and IM Moras, ‘The Akzo 
Decision: A Case of Predatory Pricing?’ (1993) 41(3) Journal of Industrial Economics 315-321, 316. 
72 Eg Post Danmark, C-23/14, EU:C:2015:651. For a clear-cut discussion of the consolidation of this trend, see P 
Ibáñez Colomo, ‘Post Danmark II: The Emergence of a Distinct ‘Effects-Based’ Approach to Article 102 TFEU’ 
(2016) 7(2) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 113-115. For background discussion, see WPJ 
Wils, ‘The Judgment of the EU General Court in Intel and the So-Called More Economic Approach to Abuse of 
Dominance’ (2014) 37(4) World Competition 405-434; P Rey and JS Venit, ‘An Effects-Based Approach to 
Article 102: A Response to Wouter Wils’ (2015) 38(1) World Competition 3-29; and P Ibáñez Colomo, ‘Intel and 
article 102 TFEU case law: making sense of a perpetual controversy’ (2014) LSE Law, Society and Economy 
working paper series 29/2014, available at https://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2014-29_Colomo.pdf, 
accessed 11 April 2016. Similar issues are discussed in other jurisdictions, such as Australia; see KA Kemp, ‘A 
Third Way: Objective Anticompetitive Purpose’ (2016) UNSW Law Research Paper No. 2016-22, available at 
ttp://ssrn.com/abstract=2735898, accessed 11 April 2016. 
73 Jones (n 70) 664. See also S King, Agreements that restrict competition by object under Article 101(1) TFEU: 
past, present and future 121-124 (2015) PhD Thesis, London School of Economics, available at 
http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3068/1/King_Agreements_that_restrict_competition_by_object_under_Article_101.pdf, 
accessed 9 December 2015. 
74 Ferriere Nord v Commission, T-143/89, EU:T:1995:64, para 41. This has been repeatedly emphasised. Most 
recently, in Romana Tabacchi v Commission, T-11/06 T:2011:560, para 227. See also ten Voorde (n Error! 
Bookmark not defined.) 558 fn 3. 
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in a recent stream of case law; see Expedia, C-226/11, EU:C:2012:795 and Maxima Latvija, C-345/14, 
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76 Schenker and Others, C-681/11, EU:C:2013:404, para 43. 
77 However, subjective elements can be relevant in terms of determination of the amount of the fine, and there are 
cases where the impossibility or high difficulty in assessing the existence of an anticompetitive conduct has been 
taken into account by the imposition of symbolic or token fines. For an overview, see S Marco Colino, Competition 
Law of the EU and UK, 7th ed (Oxford, 2011) 111-112. 
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undertakings, upon discovery of any infringement, take positive steps to publicly distance themselves 
from its content or report it to the administrative authorities.79  
Overall, it is quite clear that the case law concerning the enforcement of antitrust prohibitions 
gives almost no weight whatsoever to the assessment of subjective elements and relies on objective 
prohibitions and the assessment of objective circumstances surrounding their infringement. Thus, from 
a systematic perspective, it is submitted that this string of case law provides further support to the 
‘objectification’ of subjective analysis when it comes to the behaviour of public authorities and its 
effects, particularly in view of the duty of the public administration to act legally (discussed below §V). 
B. Coordination with the ‘Objectification’ of Other EU Economic Law Core Prohibitions 
A similar reasoning derives from the case law in other areas of EU economic law, such as non-
discrimination law (§IV.B.1), or the rules applicable to financial sanctions derived from infringements 
of the common agricultural policy (§IV.B.2). 
1. EU non-discrimination law 
Indeed, in order to prove cases of direct discrimination, it is common ‘to view direct discrimination as 
an objective question focusing on the effects of the perpetrator’s actions’.80 This was the approach 
adopted by the CJEU in a seminal case on direct sex discrimination where a pregnant woman claimed 
protection against direct sex discrimination when she was not employed due to her pregnancy and 
despite being the best candidate. The CJEU agreed and stressed that ‘only women can be refused 
employment on grounds of pregnancy and such a refusal therefore constitutes direct discrimination on 
grounds of sex’.81 The employer argued in its defence that it had no intention to discriminate against 
women because, in fact, all applicants for the job were women and, thus, the person eventually 
employed was a woman as well. The CJEU dismissed the argument on the basis that ‘whether the 
refusal to employ a woman constitutes direct or indirect discrimination depends on the reason for that 
refusal. If that reason is to be found in the fact that the person concerned is pregnant, then the decision 
is directly linked to the sex of the candidate’.82 Hence, it is clear that the CJEU assesses direct 
discrimination on the basis of the effects of the conduct and not intention.83 
Similarly, in the area of indirect discrimination, the CJEU was quick to abandon the 
requirement of intent initially created by its own case law in order to find breaches of EU economic 
law. Given the difficulty of proving a discriminatory intention in those cases—which, by their very 
nature, are concerned with non-immediate consequences of even voluntary actions—the CJEU clarified 
that the relevant test to find an infringement of EU non-discrimination law is whether the ‘practice may 
be explained by objectively justified factors unrelated to any discrimination’.84 
                                                          
79 AC-Treuhand v Commission, C-194/14 P, EU:C:2015:717, para 31; Dansk Rørindustri and Others v 
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80 M Bell, ‘Direct Discrimination’ in D Schiek, L Waddington and M Bell, Non-Discrimination Law (Hart, 2007) 
185, 228. 
81 Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassenen, C-177/88, EU:C:1990:383, para 12. 
82 Ibid, para 17. 
83 For further discussion on issues related with different linguistic versions of the Dekker Judgment, see L Mulders, 
‘Translation at the Court of Justice of the European Communities’, in S Prechal and B van Roermund (eds), 
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2. EU common agricultural policy and financial sanctions resulting from its breach 
Along the same lines, in areas of EU law that carry direct financial sanctions, such as the regulation of 
infringements of the common agricultural policy, the CJEU has also been willing to rely on objective 
factors to assess the intentionality of specific breaches.85 Such intentional element is relevant because 
it carries out a reduction in the EU funding received that would not be imposed in case of unintentional 
(ie non-negligent) breaches. In a recent case, after reducing the level of intention to a knowledge-based 
test whereby the subjective element of the prohibition is present if the infringer ‘accept[s] the possibility 
that non-compliance may result’ from its acts;86 the CJEU accepted that the proof of that subjective 
element could be satisfied on the basis of objective indicia, amongst which it included the fact that the 
contravened requirement was ‘a long-established, settled policy’. In such circumstances, the CJEU 
stressed that ‘where a Member State introduces a provision which … establishes as such a criterion [to 
determine that non-compliance was intentional] the existence of a long-established, settled policy and 
which gives a high probative value to that criterion, that State must nevertheless make it possible for 
the beneficiary of aid to adduce evidence of the lack of intent in his conduct’.87 This comes to result in 
a rebuttable presumption of intent,88 which is in line with the proposal outlined regarding the test 
applicable to the public administration (above §II). 
3. Overall preliminary assessment 
As seen in this sub-section, even in areas of EU economic law of a stronger social nature and with a 
weaker link to the functioning of the internal market, or with a closer connection to criminal law, the 
CJEU has been willing to erode the relevance of subjective assessments—or, in other words, to simply 
substitute them with objective analyses of the context in which the practices deemed to infringe EU law 
take place and the objective good reasons or factors than can justify them, or that can support a finding 
of the existence (presumption) of intent. This provides further support for the thesis advanced in this 
paper that the assessment of subjective elements in core EU economic law prohibitions needs to be 
‘objectified’. It is submitted that this is particularly clear if the interplay of such assessment with the 
right to good administration is considered in further detail. 
V. INTERPLAY WITH GENERAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST BEHAVIOUR 
OF A PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN BREACH OF EU LAW 
The discussion in previous sections has shown how, overall, there is strong support in the case law of 
the CJEU for a minimisation of the relevance of subjective elements in core EU economic law 
prohibitions and a subsequent ‘objectification’ of the assessment of the intention of the State and its 
emanations—for simplicity, the public administration—when it engages in activity deemed to breach 
EU law. This section assesses the fit or contradiction of this approach with more general protections 
against behaviour of a public administration in breach of EU law. The compatibility or otherwise of 
such approach is first assessed in relation to the right to good administration in Article 41 Charter; and 
then in relation to the doctrine of State liability for infringement of EU law. These assessments are 
intended to shed some light on the consistency or incompatibility of the standards of liability applicable 
to the assessment of the behaviour of a public administration under EU economic law—or, reversely, 
to support a corollary to the thesis advanced in this paper: ie, that an ‘objectified’ assessment of 
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subjective elements in core EU economic law prohibitions applicable to the public administration does 
not distort the general system of liability derived from EU law. 
A. Interplay with the Right to Good Administration 
It is submitted that the ‘objectified’ analysis of subjective elements in core prohibitions of EU economic 
law is consistent with the right to good administration in Article 41 Charter and its implied requirement 
for the public administration to act legally89—or, more clearly, to comply with EU law, or to ‘act under 
and within the law’.90 The same requirement derives from the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 
4(3)II TEU, whereby the Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to 
ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the 
institutions of the Union—which covers compliance with both primary and secondary EU law.91 
Under Article 41 Charter, which is engaged when EU law is (or should have been) applied,92 
the public administration has an obligation to give reasons for its decisions. Importantly, such an 
obligation to give reasons ‘is not motivated by the care for democracy and political accountability, but 
it is rather aimed at ensuring that the Court can exercise its power to review the legality of the 
measure’.93 This has been quite clearly and consistently stressed by the CJEU and the GC: 
the statement of reasons required by … Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
must be appropriate to the measure at issue and to the context in which it was adopted. 
It must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the 
institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons 
concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent court to 
exercise its power of review of the lawfulness thereof. The requirements to be satisfied 
by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case.94 
It is worth stressing that this is the functional understanding of the duty to provide reasons 
resulting from the right to good administration. Even if in the Charter the underpinning ‘principles of 
administrative law are not put in terms of objective legality in the public interest, but in the language 
of subjective public rights’,95 the obligation of the public administration to act in compliance with EU 
law clearly stands unaltered,96 is actionable as an individual right, and the reasons given by the public 
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administration to justify compliance with EU law are subject to judicial review in order to determine 
whether the public administration acted legally in the first place.97 
When this duty to act legally and to allow for a judicial review of administrative acts through 
the provision of sufficient reasons is taken into consideration, the existence of subjective elements in 
core prohibitions of EU economic law applicable to the public administration becomes a clear legal 
aberration, unless the objective assessment proposed herewith is kept and the public administration is 
not given discretion to engage in illegal behaviour. Indeed, if the public administration is bound to 
comply with EU law as a result of the duty of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3)II TEU and the specific 
requirements of the right to good administration in Article 41 Charter, there is no scope for it to validly 
deviate from such duty to act legally—ie, there is no scope to create discretion to engage in illegal 
behaviour, whatever the reasons. The standard of assessment of the activity of the public administration 
needs to be objective and, in that setting, only two outcomes are possible: either the public 
administration complied with EU law, or it did not; and it is irrelevant to engage in an assessment of 
whether, in case of non-compliance, it did so voluntarily or negligently. 
In almost all cases, the public administration knows or ought to have known that it was 
infringing EU law; and this should trigger liability and remedies (see discussion on State liability below 
§V.B). In the remaining minority of cases, where there was no negligence whatsoever by the public 
administration, the only way to justify an infringement of EU law would be to demonstrate that it acted 
diligently and relied on objectively good reasons to take the course of action that resulted in a breach 
of EU law—which brings consistency with the standard applicable to private undertakings and 
corporate actors under eg antitrust and non-discrimination law (above §IV). It is also compatible with 
the tests developed by the CJEU in the areas of public procurement (§II.A) and State aid law (§III), as 
well as the assessment for the purposes of State aid liability (§V.B). This is, thus, a sound systemic 
approach to the assessment of subjective elements in core prohibitions of EU economic law. 
Conversely, any approach that deviated from such objective analysis of the conditions in which a 
specific decision was adopted and the reasons provided thereof, would potentially breach the right to 
good administration in Article 41 Charter. It would do so by creating excessive space for illegal, or at 
least non-fully compliant, behaviour by the public administration in contravention of EU law. 
Moreover, the objective reasons given by the public administration in justification of any acts 
that deviate from the expected legally-compliant standard will need to be subjected to a strict 
proportionality assessment, particularly if the specific regulatory regime being infringed includes 
corrective mechanisms,98 or has built-in provisions that address the concerns or justifications provided 
by the public administration.99 In other words, a public administration will not be able to rely on 
otherwise good objective reasons for its non-compliant behaviour if such considerations should have 
been channelled differently, or were generally constrained by the policy options implicit in the 
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enactment of the rule of EU economic law at stake. This will prevent the public administration from 
engaging in policy-related justifications that imply a second bite of the cherry where such trade-off or 
balancing exercise is already contained in the rule from which it deviated—eg, the public administration 
will not be able to provide a justification based on social considerations if the specific regulatory scheme 
has already incorporated a policy decision on the weight that can be given to those considerations.100 
More simply, the public administration will not be able to provide any objective reasons for its 
behaviour, but it will have to provide adequate, reasonable and acceptable reasons for there to be no 
consequences derived from the (unwanted) breach of EU economic law. As discussed below, it is 
submitted that this is fundamentally aligned with the doctrine of State liability. 
B. Interplay with the Doctrine of State Liability for Infringement of EU Law 
As is well known, under the doctrine of State liability for breach of EU law,101 one of the key conditions 
to grant compensation for damages caused by the illegal behaviour of a Member State or any of its 
emanations requires to justify that the breach of EU law is ‘sufficiently serious’.102 This was first 
enounced in Brasserie du Pêcheur/Factortame III,103 and has then been progressively refined in the 
case law of the CJEU. The test was initially designed in the following terms: 
finding that a breach of [Union] law is sufficiently serious is whether the Member State 
… concerned manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on its discretion. The factors 
which the competent court may take into consideration include the clarity and precision 
of the rule breached, the measure of discretion left by that rule to the national … 
authorities, whether the infringement and the damage caused was intentional or 
involuntary, whether any error of law was excusable or inexcusable, the fact that the 
position taken by a [Union] institution may have contributed towards the omission, and 
the adoption or retention of national measures or practices contrary to [Union] law.104 
In subsequent case law, the CJEU has stressed that the  
condition requiring a sufficiently serious breach … implies manifest and grave disregard 
by the Member State for the limits set on its discretion, the factors to be taken into 
consideration in this connection being, inter alia, the degree of clarity and precision of 
the rule infringed and the measure of discretion left by that rule to the national 
authorities.105 [Additionally,] where at the time when it committed the infringement, the 
Member State in question … had only considerably reduced, or even no, discretion, the 
mere infringement of [Union] law may be sufficient to establish the existence of a 
sufficiently serious breach.106 [Consequently,] the Member State’s discretion, which is 
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broadly dependent on the degree of clarity and precision of the rule infringed, constitutes 
an important criterion in determining whether there has been a sufficiently serious breach 
of [Union] law.107 
At first reading, the inclusion of a subjective element (‘whether the infringement … was 
intentional or involuntary’) amongst the conditions that can be taken into consideration to determine 
whether an infringement of EU law is ‘sufficiently serious’ seems to create a clash with the ‘objectified’ 
assessment advocated for in this paper. However, a closer look at the case law of the CJEU and its 
evolution shows that this element has not been given significant weight in the application of the State 
liability doctrine.108 Given that State liability ‘cannot be made conditional upon fault (intentional or 
negligent) on the part of the organ of the State responsible for the breach, going beyond that of a 
sufficiently serious breach of [Union] law’,109 there has been no relevant assessment of subjective 
elements in the behaviour of the public administration at the point of engaging State liability.110 The 
assessment of the sufficient seriousness of the breach of EU law by the Member State has been 
objectified and redirected towards an analysis of its respect to the limits of whatever levels of discretion 
it enjoyed under the relevant provisions. Where there is no discretion, the assessment of intention 
becomes totally irrelevant. Indeed, where the CJEU had the necessary information to be able to apply 
the test and determine whether the facts must be held to constitute a sufficiently serious breach of Union 
law in a case where competent national institution had no substantive choice, the CJEU did not assess 
whether the infringement was intentional or involuntary and simply relied on the objective situation 
created by the public administration concerned.111 Where there is very limited discretion, the CJEU 
does not engage in any subjective assessment either and applies a test of strict liability.112 Where there 
is broader discretion, the analysis revolves around the clarity and precision of the rule infringed, and 
the CJEU tends to restrict its analysis to an objective assessment of whether the interpretation followed 
by the Member State was reasonable or excusable, but it does not delve into subjective assessments.113  
Moreover, the recent case law of the CJEU on liability derived from judicial breaches of EU 
law can provide some additional support to the claim that, generally, the test applicable under the second 
condition of the State liability doctrine does not give any significant weight to the subjective element 
requiring a determination of whether the infringement was intentional or involuntary—or, in other 
words, that the assessment needs to be reconfigured as an objective test. In that regard, even if it has 
shown some deference towards infringements of EU law by national courts, as compared to 
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infringements by the executive or the legislator,114 the CJEU still has rejected the limitation of State 
liability to cases of intentional fault and serious misconduct on the part of the court, and stressed that 
although it remains possible for national law to define the criteria relating to the nature 
or degree of the infringement which must be met before State liability can be incurred 
for an infringement of [Union] law attributable to a national court adjudicating at last 
instance, under no circumstances may such criteria impose requirements stricter than that 
of a manifest infringement of the applicable law.115 
In view of all the above, it seems clear that the subjective element that can, in principle, be 
taken into consideration under the second condition for State liability not only has not played any 
significant role so far, but it cannot do so in the future because Member States cannot impose fault-
based requirements stricter than a test of manifest infringement of the applicable law.116 It is submitted 
that this erodes, if it does not complete eliminate, any inconsistency with the ‘objectified’ assessment 
of subjective elements in EU economic law prohibitions advocated for in this paper. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper has focussed on the difficulties that the assessment of the intention of the State and its 
emanations—for simplicity, the public administration—could create for the enforcement of EU 
economic law. To avoid those problems, it has submitted the thesis that the analysis of the subjective 
elements included in core prohibitions of EU economic law applicable to the public sector, or which 
require direct intervention by a public administration, needs to be ‘objectified’ and that the intention of 
the public administration needs to be assessed by a mix of presumptions and recourse to objective 
criteria that allow for a contextual analysis of the behaviour deemed to breach EU law. 
In order to support this thesis, the paper has analysed the existing case law of the CJEU in the 
fields of public procurement and State aid as two areas of EU economic law subjected to interpretative 
and enforcement difficulties due to the introduction, sometimes veiled, of subjective elements in their 
main prohibitions. The analysis has shown how the CJEU has created a significant body of case law 
whereby the analysis of the intention of the public administration deemed to have breached EU public 
procurement or State aid rules is disregarded. The assessment rather concentrates on the factual context 
in which behaviour that created the effects proscribed by EU economic law took place, and whether it 
could be justified on the basis of objective good reasons or, at least, the public administration acted 
diligently and could legitimately hold that its behaviour was in compliance with the applicable rules. 
Generally, then, in these areas of EU economic law where the rules are addressed to the State and its 
emanations, the analysis of subjective elements is clearly ‘objectified’ by the CJEU. 
The paper has also shown how this approach is in line with the benchmarks derived from other 
areas of EU economic law where the provisions are mainly directed to undertakings—ie private or 
public legal entities engaged in economic activity. In a similar fashion, in the areas of antitrust, non-
discrimination law and the common agricultural policy, the CJEU has eroded or completely suppressed 
any assessment of the intent of the infringers of EU law, and substituted them with an assessment of the 
concurrence of any objective reasons that could justify their behaviour in a way that rationally explains 
                                                          
114 For discussion of the standard, see B Beutler, ‘State Liability for Breaches of Community Law by National 
Courts: Is the Requirement of a Manifest Infringement of the Applicable Law an Insurmountable Obstacle?’ 
(2009) 46 (3) Common Market Law Review 773. Cf N Zingales, ‘Member State Liability vs. National Procedural 
Autonomy: What Rules for Judicial Breach of EU Law?’ (2010) 11 (4) German Law Journal 419. 
115 Traghetti del Mediterraneo, C-173/03, EU:C:2006:391, para 44. 
116 Köbler, C-224/01, EU:C:2003:513, paras 53 to 56. 
22 
the infringement and justifies it. In the case of antitrust rules, the CJEU has given particular weight to 
the fact that infringing undertakings generally know or ought to have known that their behaviour was 
bound to create the effects prohibited by Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The paper has stressed that the 
same approach is clearly applicable to the public administration in view of its duty to act legally. 
Indeed, the paper has emphasised that the public administration is bound to comply with EU 
law as a result of the duty of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3)II TEU and the specific requirements of 
the right to good administration in Article 41 Charter—so that there is no scope for it to validly deviate 
from such duty to act legally. Moreover, the duty to provide reasons that derives from the right to good 
administration is aimed at allowing a judicial review of the acts of the public administration where 
subjective elements play no role. The justifications or good reasons provided by the public 
administration are subjected to an objective analysis and a strict proportionality test, which are also 
compatible with the thesis advanced in the paper. Such compatibility has also been tested with the State 
liability doctrine. The paper has shown how, despite the old formulation of the criteria that can be taken 
into account to determine whether an infringement of EU law by a public administration is sufficiently 
serious and, consequently, gives rise to a claim in damages, the evolution of the case law of the CJEU 
excludes the possibility to impose fault-based requirements stricter than a test of manifest infringement 
of the applicable law. It has been submitted that this erodes, if it does not complete eliminate, any 
inconsistency with the ‘objectified’ assessment of subjective elements in EU economic law prohibitions 
advocated for in this paper. 
In view of the discussion above, it seems clear that the introduction of subjective elements in 
core prohibitions of EU economic law applicable to the public administration is ineffectual and does 
not alter the analysis that derives from otherwise objective tests. The CJEU has repeatedly set aside, 
ignored or eroded the subjective elements created by the EU legislator or by older case law. In the end, 
the practical leitmotif of such interpretive strategy is that it is very difficult, if not completely impossible, 
to identify whose individual intention is determinative of the institutional behaviour under assessment. 
Designing, interpreting and enforcing rules addressed to legal entities in terms of the ‘intent’ of such 
bodies is legally impractical and creates legal uncertainty and risks of diminished effectiveness of EU 
economic law.  
An understanding of these rules in terms of effects and an objective assessment of the 
circumstances in which they are produced, and the reasons therefor, is a superior regulatory device—
and quite a natural one, as the organic evolution of the case law of the CJEU shows. Thus, from a 
normative point of view, it is preferable to advocate a construction of EU economic law around 
objective prohibitions. That would avoid the need to carry out complex analytical assessments in order 
to pin down the intent of the public administration—and, likewise, of private and public undertakings 
and non-natural persons—as well as convoluted reasoning aimed at overcoming the divide between the 
analysis of the observable (objective) circumstances in which breaches of EU law take place, and the 
second-guessing of the ultimate (subjective) reasons that triggered them. The thesis advocated in this 
paper, ie that the intention of the State and its emanations needs to be assessed in an objectified manner 
by a mix of presumptions and recourse to objective criteria that allow for a contextual analysis of the 
behaviour deemed to breach EU law, avoids both the need to engage in window dressing exercises 
through convoluted reasoning, and the risk of chasing ghosts at the risk of exonerating the public 
administration from liability when its intent to infringe EU economic law cannot be pinned down in the 
(possibly non-existent) paper trails leading to the infringement. 
